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CASES NOTED
limitation is that of common sense and general tort law that "[f]or a right
of contribution to accrue between tort-feasors, they must be joint wrongdoers
in the sense that their tort or torts have imposed a common liability upon
them to the party injured,"' and that for the wrongdoers to be considered
joint tort-feasors they must contribute simultaneously to the injury; there
cannot be two or more independent acts.8 In the only case involving con-
tribution in a non-collision situation considered by the United States Su-
preme Court prior to the instant case, contribution was denied solely be-
cause of a contract between the parties limiting the liability.9 The lan-
guage of the decision makes it clear that, had there been no such contract,
the usual rules of contribution in admiralty would have been applied.' 0 At
least one federal court has held that this case is one upholding the right to
contribution in non-collision cases."
The rationale of the instant case is that the court should not "fashion
new judicial rules of contribution," 2-' but await legislative action. The rea-
son ascribed by the Court for its position is the presence of the various con-
flicting interests of ship owners, dry dock, stevedoring and insurance
companies.
The fear of fashioning new rules would appear to be a little tardy since
it has been the practice of the lower courts, at least since 1924, to allow
contribution in this type of case.13 Indeed, the Supreme Court overlooks
its own admission in the Porello case, albeit in the dictum, of the existence
of this right. In effect, what the Court has done, then, is to fashion a new
judicial rule through its denial of a remedy which has been available in
admiralty for the past twenty-eight years; "the well established rule of con-
tribution between joint tort-feasors."''14 It has overruled and reversed both
the lower courts and itself, substituting confusion for what was, until now,
considered a settled point of maritime law.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW - CONTEMPT
A presentment to the Supreme Court of New Jersey by a county bar
association committee on the unauthorized practice of law asked that de-
7. Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947). RE-
STATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 86 (1937).
8. United States v. Rothschild International Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th
Cir. 1950); The Mars, 9 F.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
9. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
10. Id. at 458 (" . . . the usual rule in admiralty, in the absence of contract, is for
each joint toitfeasor to pay the injured party a moiety of the damages. ... ).
11. Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
12. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 72 Sup. Ct. 277, 280
(1952).
13. The Jethou, 2 F.2d 287 (D. Ore. 1924).
14. Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
fendants, laymen who had drawn a will for another, be cited for contempt,
although the unauthorized practice is punishable by statute as a misdemean-
or.' Held, that a state supreme court has the power to punish, as contempt,
the unauthorized practice of law. In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1951).
The judiciary has inherent power to regulate the practice of law,2 and
because it controls the admission to practice, it likewise has the corollary
power to punish, as contempt, the unlicensed practice of law.8 Moreover,
the New Jersey Constitution expressly confers upon the instant court power
to control admissions to the bar and to discipline its members.4 Such
power also carries with it the power to prevent laymen from practicing
law.5 In Paul v. Stanley' it was recognized that a member of the bar pos-
sesses a franchise which entitles him to bring a complaint against one prac-
ticing law without authority.
The practice of law includes not only court work,7 but any work requir-
ing legal knowledge or skill.8 However, a single instance of drawing a legal
instrument, in the absence of statute, does not usually constitute "unlawful
practice," as the substance of the offense is the habitual practice by those
unauthorized.9  Also controlling is the character of the act done.',
The fact that unauthorized practice of law may also be punishable
tinder a statute does not prevent a court from using its contempt power."
Such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede or detract from,
the inherent powers of the judiciary to control the practice of law.' 2  Ordi-
narily, however, the court will not exercise this drastic power.' 3  In the
1. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2:111 1, 3 (1937) ("practice" includes preparation of wills
and deeds).
2. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937); In re Richards, 33 Mo.
907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924).
3. People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 NYV. 95
(1936); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 Al. 139
(1935); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 AI. 550 (1924).
4. N.J. CONsT. Art VI, § 2, par. 3.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932) (in a proper case the court can enjoin
the unauthorized practice).
7. See People ex Tel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344
I11. 462, 473, 176 N.E. 901, 906.
8. Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939)
(the preparation of wills for others is the practice of law and may not be carried on by
one not a licensed attorney).
9. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. lersin, 101 Colo. 406, 74 P.2d 668 (1938)
(drawing of a will by one not an attorney, who did not make a practice of doing so,
and did not hold himself out as willing and competent to do so, did not constitute
practice of law).
10. See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 357, 8 N.E.2d
941, 947, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728, rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937) (amount
of money and number of transactions involved was also considered).
11. State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 628 N.W. 95 (1936). See In re
Bugasch, 12 N.J. Misc. 788, 790, 175 At. 110, 111 (1934).
12. In re Day, 181 II1. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto-
mobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 At. 139 (1935).
13. In re McCallum, 186 Wash. 312, 57 P.2d 1259 (1936); In re Estes, 186
Wash. 690, 57 P.2d 1262 (1936).
CASES NOTED
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n case,' 4 the court deter-
mined that contempt should be invoked only when there is an evident need
for summary action to protect the public and the jurisdiction of the court.
It is not to be encouraged for punishing trivial or unimportant instances of
illegal practice of the law.'5
In the absence of a regulatory statute the contempt citation of the
court is substantially the only method for punishing unauthorized practice,
but where other remedies are available and efficient, they should first be
invoked.16 Criminal contempt is a summary proceeding and, as such, dan-
gerous. Where a statute makes the unauthorized practice of law a crime, as
in the instant case, summary action is merely an alternative method, the
results of which might be unjust when compared with the ordinary protec-
tion afforded in the processes of the criminal courts.' 7
CONFLICT OF LAWS - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CONFLICTING DECREES IN SISTER STATES
Petitioner divorced respondent in Illinois in 1939, and was awarded
alimony in installments for as long as she should remain unmarried. In
1944, in Nevada, petitioner married one Henzel who had obtained a Nevada
divorce from a resident of New York. After this Nevada decree had been
declared void' by a New York court, petitioner obtained a New York decree
of annulment of her marriage to Henzel,2 and then married a third man.
Petitioner then filed suit, asserting diversity jurisdiction, in district court in
Illinois, for unpaid installments of alimony from respondent for the period
from the Nevada marriage to her third presumably valid marriage in New
York. Held, on certiorari, that the New York decree of annulment was
entitled to full faith and credit and the Nevada decree of divorce was not,
but that the effect of the annulment on respondent's obligation to pay ali-
mony should be determined in the district court under Illinois law. Sutton
v. Leib, 72 Sup. Ct. 398 (1952).
The problem suggested in the instant case is one whose growth may
be traced from the second Williams4 case, which affirmed that it was not a
denial of full faith and credit5 for a sister state to make separate inquiry
14. 255 R.I. 122, 179 At!. 139 (1935).
15. Id. at 129, 179 Aft. at 142.
16. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 At].
139 (1935); In re Bugasch, 12 NJ. Misc. 788, 175 Atl. 110 (1934).
17. People ax rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 366, 8 N.E.2d 941,
951, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728, rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937) (dissent);
In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505, 515 (N.J. 1951) (dissent).
1. By means of a separate maintenance proceeding instituted by Henzel's first wife.
2. This judgment declared that petitioner's marriage to Henzel was "null and void"
for the reason that he "had another wife living at the time of said marriage."
3. 188 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1951).
4. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
5. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
